Comparable Worth: A Common Dilemma by McCrudden, Christopher
Comparable Worth: A Common Dilemma
Christopher McCruddent
Introduction
There is currently a vigorous debate in the United States over the con-
cept of comparable worth.1 This debate, however, has virtually ignored
the European experience in grappling with the important questions sur-
rounding this issue.2 Indeed, many American participants3 in the debate
are shocked to discover that comparable worth has been a legal require-
ment in the European Economic Community (EEC)4 for almost ten
years. I believe that an examination of Europe's experience with compa-
rable worth can inform the American debate.5
For example, the European experience may help to answer some issues
currently raised but as yet unresolved: Do claims for comparable worth
f Fellow and Tutor in Law, Lincoln College, University of Oxford; CUF Lecturer, Uni-
versity of Oxford. Papers based on earlier drafts were discussed in seminars at Harvard Law
School, University of Pennsylvania Law School, UCLA Law School, and University of San
Diego Law School. My thanks to participants. Special thanks to J. Bellace, K. Bertelsmann,
B. Rudden, H. Lazerow, L. Liebman, G. Schwartz, M. Schwartzchild and R. Stevens. Above
all, however, I must thank the faculty (especially H. Hansmann, S. Simitis and H. Wellington)
and students of the Yale Law School, where I was a Visiting Fellow and Lecturer during the
fall semester 1985, for providing such a stimulating and welcoming environment.
I. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1986, at A8, col. 6 (Washington state legislature approves
settlement with union on comparable worth claim); id., Sept. 6, 1985, at A18, col. 3 (union and
women's groups vow to continue comparable worth fight despite adverse court ruling); id.,
Aug. 17, 1985, at A7, col. 6 (U.S. Dep't of Justice files amicus brief with Supreme Court
opposing comparable worth).
2. The American literature is voluminous. Much of it is discussed in Weiler, The Wages of
Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728 (1986).
3. There has been one prior American treatment of the European experience on compara-
ble worth. See Bellace, A Foreign Perspective, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND PER-
SPECTIVES (E. Livernash ed. 1980). This article did not, however, grasp the full significance of
the European developments because it was completed prior to some of the more important
developments discussed below. This limitation was partially corrected by the author in a sub-
sequent article. See Bellace, Comparable Worth: Proving Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 IOWA
L. REV. 655, 702-03 (1984). Nevertheless, the earlier article appears to have led subsequent
commentators to assume that Europe has only a limited experience, see, e.g., Weiler, supra
note 2. Few commentators appear to have noted Bellace's perceptive references in her more
recent article to the relevance of the European experience for the American debate. Unfortu-
nately, she has failed to expand on her initial observations.
4. The EEC consists of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
5. On the issue of comparable worth, the European Parliament has termed the European
Community "one of the most progressive judicial areas in the world." EUROPEAN PARLIA-
MENT, THE SITUATION OF WOMEN IN EUROPE 12 (1984).
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ignore the "economic realities" of supply and demand? 6 Would they in-
volve agencies and courts "in the impossible task of ascertaining the
worth of comparable work, an area in which they have little expertise? "7
Is it possible or desirable to compare dissimilar jobs satisfactorily? 8
Would comparable worth result in a major restructuring of the American
economy by challenging basic cultural assumptions about the relative
value of the activities of different social groups?9 Europe's experience
can provide invaluable background to the problems faced by the United
States. Sometimes we need not reinvent the wheel.10
This Article provides an introduction to the law of comparable worth
in the countries of the European Economic Community. It will describe
how the concept of comparable worth evolved and examine how it has
come to operate in practice.II Part I will sketch the development of the
comparable worth (or equal value) 12 standard by the EEC, up to the
adoption of the standard by all Member States. Part II provides a legal
analysis of comparable worth in Europe. 13 It will both assess the sub-
6. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 184 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See also AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1986,
supra note 1.
7. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 184 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8. See generally COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION (H. Remick ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as WAGE DISCRIMINATION]; M. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARA-
BLE WORTH (1983); Krauthammer, From Bad to Worth, NEW REPUBLIC, July 30, 1984, at
16.
9. See, e.g., WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 8.
10. The United States' experience has been influential, for example, in the development of
British anti-discrimination legislation. See McCrudden, Institutional Discrimination, 2 Ox-
FORD J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1982). See also Covington, American and British Employment
Discrimination Law: An Introductory Comparative Survey, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359
(1977).
11. My concerns in this Article are limited, but not, I hope, idiosyncratic. I do not intend
to analyze the practice of comparable worth in Europe, except to look briefly at the extent of
litigation. See infra notes 86-88. Such analysis would involve detailed research into the extent
to which comparable worth has been incorporated into collective bargaining. Some countries
appear to approach the issue almost entirely from this perspective and see litigation as periph-
eral. Perhaps the best example is Denmark, see infra note 87. I shall neither attempt to esti-
mate the possible economic effects of the equal value standard on levels of employment, wages,
or inflation, nor attempt to assess the advantages of achieving the goals sought by alternative
methods (e.g., by enforcing those laws requiring equal access to jobs, or affirmative action in
hiring and promotions). I shall also not attempt to prove or disprove hypotheses as to how the
labor market operates in order to base the comparable worth strategy.
12. Three terms are used in different countries for a similar concept: "comparable worth"
tends to predominate in the United States, "equal value" in Europe, and "pay equity" in Can-
ada. For a discussion of the Canadian experience, see Cadieux, Canada's Equal Pay for Work
of Equal Value Law, in WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 8, at 173. The Canadian province
of Ontario is currently considering whether to enact some form of comparable work legisla-
tion. See, e.g., ONTARIO ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR WOMEN'S
ISSUES, GREEN PAPER ON PAY EQUITY (1985) [hereinafter cited as ONTARIO GREEN PAPER].
13. One must approach the task of comparing the case law of the Member States of the
EEC on this issue with a considerable degree of trepidation and with a recognition that the
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stantive law of the Member States and present many of the most impor-
tant elements of the statutory and case law on equal value. This will be
accomplished by examining five main questions. First, what does "equal
value" mean? Second, what is the scope of comparison (by which jobs
may be compared)? Third, what, if any, defenses are available to an em-
ployer to justify differences in remuneration between men and women
engaged in work of equal value? Fourth, which benefits provided by an
employer to her employees should be regarded as pay, and thus subject to
the equality principle? Fifth, what is the relationship between the equal
value requirement and collective agreements? Though comparable worth
has a lengthy history in Europe, there still exist many legal ambiguities
and substantial uncertainties yet to be resolved. Finally, in concluding
this Article, Part III briefly analyzes the development of comparable
worth in the EEC and points to some of the lessons learned. I hope that
these final thoughts will sharpen the American debate by providing rele-
vant experiences of others who have tried and sometimes succeeded in
implementing this important concept.
I. The Evolution of the "Equal Work" Standard by the EEC
A. The "Equal Work" Standard of Article 119
The EEC is a customs union whose raison d'etre is the promotion of
free trade and a free labor market among the Member States of the Com-
munity. When the Treaty of Rome, 14 which established the EEC in
1957, was being drafted, some countries with equal pay laws in their na-
tional legislation feared that they would be at a competitive disadvantage
to those future Member States without such laws. 15 This problem was
solved by inserting article 119 into the Treaty, which provided that equal
pay for equal work was henceforth a Community legal requirement. Ar-
ticle 119 required Member States "during the first stage," that is, by De-
task is full of dangers. See Kahn-Freund, On the Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37
'MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974). I would have fallen into error much more frequently without the
assistance of both the national reports of the European Network from which I have drawn,
and COMM'N OF THE EUR. COMM., NATIONAL REPORTS (1985) [hereinafter cited as NA-
TIONAL REPORTS], a collection of papers prepared for the European Conference on Equality in
Law Between Men and Women in the European Community, organized in Louvain-La-Neuve,
Belgium (May 22-24, 1985). An earlier version of Part II of this Article was presented as a
paper during this conference. A useful analysis was published while this Article was in prepa-
ration. See E. LANDAU, THE RIGHTS OF WORKING WOMEN IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(1985). This book includes the texts of many of the national laws discussed. See infra.
14. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. For a useful sourcebook for this
treaty and for the Directives discussed below, see generally BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS (B.
Rudden & D. Wyatt eds. 1986).




cember 31, 1961, "[to] ensure and subsequently maintain the application
of the principle that men and women shall receive equal pay for equal
work." For the purposes of the article, "pay" meant the "ordinary basic
or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash
or in kind, which the worker receives directly or indirectly, in respect of
his employment from his employer." Equal pay without discrimination
based on sex meant: "(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall
be calculated on the basis of the same unit of measurement; (b) that pay
for the same work at time rates shall be the same for the same job."
Member States were not at that time willing to follow the International
Labour Organization's (ILO) broader phraseology of "equal pay for
work of equal value" found in ILO Convention No. 100, apparently be-
cause they foresaw difficulties of interpretation that this standard might
create. 16
Little progress was made in achieving even this limited aim of equal
pay for equal work, and in May 1960, the Council of Ministers of the
EEC 17 declared its wish to hasten the achievement of a number of social
policy goals, including equal pay.' 8 It requested that the European Com-
mission' 9 prepare detailed suggestions for achieving the aims of article
119. The Commission made several proposals,20 including one requiring
Member States to implement article 119 before the end of June 1961 "by
taking action to exclude any discrimination based on sex so far as the
remuneration of workers is concerned." 2'
It soon became clear that little would be accomplished towards achiev-
ing equal pay by December 31, 1961, the end of the first stage. Some
Member States were unwilling to move from the first stage to a second
stage in any other area of EEC activity without progress by all Members
on achieving equal pay. Agreement on principles giving greater effect to
article 119 was viewed as "form[ing] part of the 'package deal' which
cleared the way for the transition" to the second stage of the "transi-
tional period of the common market," as provided for by article 8(3) of
16. Id. at 84. See also infra note 43.
17. The Council of Ministers is a body of representatives of Member State governments
charged with lawmaking powers under article 145 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 14.
18. EUR. ECON. COMM. COMM'N, THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
COMMUNITY 195 (1960).
19. The European Commission is the policy-making secretariat of the Treaty of Rome.
See supra note 14.
20. Recommendations by the Commission to the Member States relating to article 119 of
the Treaty, BULL. EUR. ECON. COMM. Nos. 6 & 7, Aug./Sept. 1960.
21. Id. at 46.
Yale Journal of International Law
the Treaty of Rome.22 At the end of 1961, the governments agreed in a
resolution "that the progressive implementation of the principle of equal
remuneration for men and women workers is intended to abolish all dis-
crimination in the fixing of wages .... -23 Member States further "recog-
nize[d] that any practices of systematic downgrading of women workers
shall be incompatible with the principle of equal remuneration when...
criteria in job evalution for the classification of workers are used which
are not related to the objective conditions in which the work is done."'24
A timetable was then drawn up for the elimination of discriminatory dif-
ferentials by the end of 1964. Unfortunately, the Community did not
adhere to the timetable, and both the Commission and the individual
Member States remained silent.
B. The Development of the "Equal Value" Standard
Despite its slow beginnings, the equal pay standard of the EEC devel-
oped rapidly during the 1970's. To understand the details of these devel-
opments, a brief introduction to lawmaking in the EEC is necessary. The
EEC treaty is largely a framework that may be filled in by both supple-
mentary legislative action and by judicial interpretation. Legislative
power is given to the Council of Ministers to act on a proposal from the
European Commission, usually after consulting the European Parliament
and the European Economic and Social Committee.25 New laws may
take various forms with different legal implications for the Member
States. One of the most common methods, however, is for the Council of
Ministers to legislate by way of a Directive. This binds Member States as
to the ends to be achieved but not as to the means. 26
Judicial interpretation arises, most relevantly for the purposes of this
Article, in two ways. First, the Commission may initiate proceedings
directly against a Member State in the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
alleging that the state is not complying with its obligations under the
Treaty or a Directive. In addition, where the requirements of the Treaty
or a Directive are directly effective in the Member State, an individual
may make use of them directly in domestic legal proceedings, even where
there is no such provision in the national legislation. If a national court
is faced in this way with a question of EEC law, it may, and in some
22. 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY-A
COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY 119.04, at 3-762 (1985).
23. Equal Remuneration for Equal Work as Between Men and Women Workers, BULL.
EUR. ECON. COMM. No. 11, Jan. 1962, at 8.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 17 & infra note 36.




circumstances must, refer the. issue to the ECJ for a preliminary
decision. 27
After 1971, the ECJ was faced with an increasing number of references
by national courts arising out of domestic cases based on article 119. At
first the ECJ was cautious. In an early decision, 28 for example, a woman
unsuccessfully alleged that differential pension rights contravened article
119. Despite the cautious holding in that case, however, the Advocate
General did indicate that article 119 could be relied on in some circum-
stances by individuals in national courts.29 Thereafter, the ECJ became
more assertive as more cases were referred to it. In the 1976 decision,
Defrenne (No. 2), 3 0 the ECJ held not only that article 119 was in part
directly effective (i.e., it gave a woman a right to equal pay enforceable in
the national courts), but also that it was a right enforceable against pri-
vate as well as public employees, insofar as it was directly effective in the
Member State. This decision had the consequence that individual wo-
men could now act directly to enforce the Treaty. Despite the tardiness
of the Commission, therefore, enforcement action was now possible.
In 1972, a report on the employment of women in the EEC concluded
that widespread sex discrimination in employment existed in all Member
States.31 Following this, a 1973 European Commission report expressed
for the first time the Commission's intention to initiate proceedings
against Member States that had breached their obligation to implement
article 119.32 At first, however, little action was taken on this threat.
Another impetus for the development of a standard was a growing
concern by the EEC in the early 1970's about its image as solely an eco-
nomic institution. In response to this concern, the EEC soon developed
a progressive social policy in a number of areas, including sex discrimina-
tion. This new attention led the EEC to enact several far-reaching legal
requirements concerning employment discrimination against women,33
27. Id. art. 177.
28. Defrenne v. Belgian State, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. (Preliminary Ruling).
29. Id. at 454-62.
30. Defrenne v. Sabena (Belg. Airlines), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455.
31. E. SULLEROT, THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AND THE PROBLEMS IT RAISES IN THE
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 47-50 (1972) (report published by
Comm'n of the Eur. Comm.).
32. 1973 EUR. ECON. COMM. Doc. (No. 3,000 final) pt. 248 (July 18, 1973); a report on
the new members of the Community (Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom) was drawn
up in 1974 EUR. ECON. COMM. Doc. (No. 742 final) (July 17, 1974). The Commission's
power to initiate proceedings against a Member State (termed "infringement proceedings")
before the European Court of Justice is based on article 169 of the Treaty of Rome. See supra
note 14.
33. In addition to the Equal Pay Directive, see infra note 42 and accompanying text, the
EEC has two other binding directives on sexual equality: the Equal Treatment Directive,
Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 19 (1976); and the Social
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including requirements relating to equal pay. In January 1974, the
Council adopted a Social Action Programme that contained recommen-
dations on how to achieve "equality between men and women as regards
access to employment and vocational training and advancement and as
regards working conditions, including pay. .... -34
Meanwhile, in November 1973, the European Commission had sub-
mitted a proposal for a Council Directive on the further development of
article 119's principle of equal pay for men and women.35 The European
Parliament, 36 after a report by its Committee on Social Affairs and Em-
ployment,37 welcomed the initiative but proposed several amendments
designed to counter various aspects of discrimination felt to be inade-
quately covered in the Commission's proposals.3 8 The Economic and So-
cial Committee39 approved this initiative with some further amendments
in March 1974.40
The amended Commission proposal was presented to the Council of
Ministers in July 1974.41 In February 1975, the Council adopted the
version of the Commission proposal amended by the Economic and So-
cial Committee as Directive No. 75/117.42 The Directive's effect was to
toughen up the equal pay standard of article 119. While article 119
spoke of "equal pay for equal work," the new standard became that of
the ILO Convention 100, by now ratified by all Member States:43 "equal
pay for work of equal value" -or "comparable worth" as it is known in
the United States. The 1975 Directive defined article 119's "principle of
equal pay" to mean pay "for the same work or for work to which equal
Security Directive, Council Directive 79/7/EEC, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 6) (1979). See
E. WALLACE & E. DAVIES, WOMEN OF EUROPE (1986); RIGHTS OF WOMEN: EUROPE, WO-
MEN'S RIGHTS AND THE EEC (1983).
34. 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (Nos. C13/1, 13/3) (1974).
35. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. Cl 14/46) (1973) (communications and information).
36. The European Parliament is largely a debating and advisory forum.
37. 1974 EUR. ECON. COMM. Doc. (No. 21/74/Rev.)
38. 17 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. C55/43/45) (1974) (communications and information).
[Editor's note: all translations of foreign sources completed by author].
39. This committee is a body composed of representatives of employers and labor.
40. 17 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. C88/6) 8 (1974).
41. 1974 EUR. ECON. COMM. Doc. (No. 1010 final) (July 1974).
42. 18 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. 19) (1975) (legislation of the European Community).
43. See ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCES, 60TH SESS., REPORT III (REPORT
2), EQUAL REMUNERATION (1975); ILO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS: OBSER-
VATIONS CONCERNING RATIFIED CONVENTIONS (1977, at 192-97); (1980, at 138-47); (1981,
at 149-50); (1982, at 152-56); (1984, at 188-202). The ILO Convention No. 100 of 1951 (Equal
Remuneration Principle) was ratified by the EEC Member States as follows: France (1953);
Federal Republic of Germany (1956); Italy (1956); Denmark (1960); Belgium (1962); Luxem-




value is attributed, [and] the elimination of all discrimination on grounds
of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration." 44
This was the first time that article 119 was defined to mean equal pay
for work of equal value, for this definition had been included in neither
the European Commission's initial nor its later amended proposals. In
adding this definition, the Council of Ministers was responding to various
developments. During parliamentary debates, for example, members had
argued for equalizing pay for work of equal value and for removing dis-
crimination in job evaluation schemes.45 A resolution of the European
Parliament also stated that "discrimination continues in job evaluation
with less importance attached to skill, speed and concentration than to
muscle power although more equitable methods have been known for
many years." 46
The opinion of the Economic and Social Committee was even more
forthright. The Committee, in arguing that article 119 should not be
interpreted restrictively, drew attention both to the passage of the resolu-
tion of December 30, 1961,47 and to the ratification of ILO Convention
No. 100 by nine Member States.4 8 The Committee also urged the ampli-
fication of the article 119 requirement of equal treatment for men and
women in conditions of remuneration. It recommended that equal pay
should be defined as "equal treatment of men and women, without dis-
crimination on the grounds of sex, in respect of their conditions of remu-
neration, including assessment criteria. '4 9 Moreover, the Committee
had recommended that the term "equivalent work" should be used in-
stead of "equal work," because substituting the former term would "stop
the practice of classifying women who do equivalent work to men in
'low-wage groups.' -50
C. The Adoption of "Equal Value" by the United Kingdom, Ireland,
and the Other Member States
So far, I have shown that the equal pay concept was originally in-
cluded in the EEC Treaty because of the economic competition between
Member States who had already adopted the concept and those who had
not, and that the meaning of the concept was expanded during the 1970's
44. See supra note 42, art. 1 (emphasis added).
45. See Remarks of Mr. van den Gun, 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 175) 177, 177-78 (1974);
see also Remarks of Lady Elles, id. at 180.
46. Resolution of European Parliament during debates on art. 119, id. at Point 2.
47. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 43.
49. 17 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. C88/8) (1974).
50. Id.
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to include equal pay for work of equal value. Before examining the en-
forcement of this standard in the various Member States, I will first con-
sider the initial adoption of the standard by two states that were not
original members of the EEC-the United Kingdom and Ireland. The
policy of these countries displays different ways of considering the issue
of equal pay.
The British Equal Pay Act of 197051 was developed partly in anticipa-
tion of future United Kingdom membership in the EEC. The Act
steered a middle course between what the United Kingdom perceived as
the two extremes: the "equal work" standard of article 119 of the Treaty
of Rome and the "equal value" standard of the ILO Convention 100.
The United Kingdom thus adopted standards of "like work" and "work
rated as equivalent." Where a woman's work fell into one of these two
categories, equal pay was required, unless the employer proved that any
variation between a man's and woman's contract of employment was
"genuinely due to a material difference other than the difference of
sex."
52
The British Act defined "like work" as work that was "the same" or of
a "broadly similar nature," where the differences "are not of practical
importance in relation to terms and conditions of employment. '53 A wo-
man's work was to be rated as "equivalent" to a man's work if "her job
and [his] job have been given an equal value, in terms of the demand
made on a worker under various headings (for instance effort, skill, deci-
sion)," by a study undertaken to evaluate those demands.5 4 These stan-
dards went beyond what was thought to be necessary to comply with
article 119, but they did not go as far as mandating the equal value
standard.
Ireland, contemplating the consequences of its future EEC member-
ship, predicted a different standard for the EEC. The Irish government
established a Commission on the Status of Women in March 1970. This
body examined what legislation should be introduced and what action
should be taken to increase equality of opportunity. The final report to
the Minister for Finance, published in December 1972,55 contained rec-
ommendations that have formed the basis for much subsequent Irish
51. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41. For a background to the Act, see E. MEEHAN, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS AT WORK 29-58 (1985).
52. Id. § 1(3).
53. Id. § 1(4).
54. Id. § 1(5).
55. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF FINANCE




legislation, including the provision that an "equal value" test be incorpo-
rated into the proposed equal pay legislation.5 6
The Commission had two reasons for recommending the equal value
test. First, it found the "same, or broadly similar work" test was too
limiting, for:
Outside the public service such a provision would affect only a relatively
small proportion of women workers. A considerable number of women
who are performing the jobs the requirements of which may well be judged
to be equivalent to the requirements of the jobs performed by men, but
which are remunerated less well, would be unaffected. 57
Second, the Commission was anticipating Ireland's membership in the
Community. Although article 119 provided for equal pay for equal
work, "[s]ubsequent interpretations of the intention of the Treaty have
tended... to widen this provision to extend it in the direction of equal
pay for work of equal value." 58 The Commission's recommendations
were accepted, and an Anti-Discrimination Act regarding pay provisions
was passed in 1974 incorporating the equal value test.59 This act pro-
vided that persons would be regarded as performing like work not only
where the work is performed under "the same or similar conditions," or
is "of a similar nature," 6 but also "where the work performed by one is
equal in value to that performed by the other in terms of the demands it
makes in relation to such matters as skill, physical or mental effort, re-
sponsibility and working conditions. ' 61 The Irish Act contained no re-
strictions like those in the British Act requiring that job evaluation
schemes be introduced voluntarily before "equal value" could be used to
initiate a claim.
Whatever the explanations for the development of different equal value
standards in the U.K., Ireland, and the Member States of the EEC in the
period up to 1974,62 the increasing economic problems that Europe en-
56. Id. para. 92.
57. Id. para. 91.
58. Id. para. 90.
59. Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act, 1974, 1974 AcTs OF THE OIREACHTAS 211 (Republic
of Ireland).
60. Id. §§ 3(a)-3(b).
61. Id. § 3(c).
62. Some view the evolution of legal provisions in essentially crude materialist terms, see-
ing them as part of the ideological superstructure, the content of which is determined by the
material base of economic and technological developments. They might well view the develop-
ment of "equal value" at this time as an attempt to update European ideology to square it with
changes that had already occurred or were rapidly occurring. The availability of effective
contraceptives, for example, contributed to the influx of more and more women into the Euro-
pean labor force. An ideology of the value of the work women do based on the needs of an
earlier economy was thus increasingly out of date. A new ideology was therefore developed
that reinforced and explained these changes.
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countered in the mid-1970's contributed to a change in political and eco-
nomic priorities. Governments no longer assumed that their economies
would continue to grow; instead, they planned for continued high levels
of long-term unemployment. Member States turned away from the Eu-
ropean Commission's social proposals, including equal value.63 Resist-
ance to incorporating the provisions of the Equal Value Directive in the
domestic legislation of the Member States increased.
Despite this resistance, by 1978 the Commission began to prepare for
more direct enforcement action against Member States that had not im-
plemented the Directive. This development was undoubtedly stimulated
by the criticisms of the Commission by the ECJ64 and by the European
Parliament. 65 In January 1979, the Commission published a report dis-
cussing the means by which the principle of equal pay should be applied,
and indicated yet again that it would institute proceedings against Mem-
ber States that had disregarded the Directive.6 6 This time, in sharp con-
trast to its inaction in 1973, the Commission initiated proceedings. 67
The Commission sent formal notice of failure to implement the Direc-
tive to Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom. The Italian constitutional and
legislative provisions 68 and the Irish legislation69 had, by contrast, satis-
fied the requirements of the Directive. Actions against France, Ger-
63. In Ireland, for example, the Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act, supra note 59, was passed
in 1974. An amending bill was introduced in the Irish Parliament by the government in De-
cember 1975. Its purpose was to postpone until December 31, 1977, at the latest,.the imple-
mentation of equal pay in the private sector which was experiencing difficulties. The
government notified the European Commission on February 5, 1976 and made an application
to derogate from applying Directive 75/117, supra text accompanying note 42, on the basis of
article 135 of the Treaty of Accession. The Commission, while acknowledging the difficulties
of the Irish economy, was unable, on grounds of principle, to comply with this request, and the
bill was therefore withdrawn.
64. In Defrenne v. Sabena (BeIg. Airlines), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455, 481, the ECJ
pointed out that the absence of infringement actions against Member States by the Commis-
sion was likely to reinforce the impression that article 119 was more limited in effect than it is.
65. The European Parliament had "deplore[d] the lack of urgency with which [the Euro-
pean Commission] appear[ed] to be encouraging the Member States to respond to Article
119." Burrows, The Promotion of Women's Rights by the European Economic Community, 17
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 191, 198 (1980).
66. 1978 EUR. COMM'N Doc. (No. 711 final) para. 6.1.79, at 144.
67. See Forman, The Equal Pay Principle Under Community Law: A Commentary on Arti-
cle 119 EEC, in I LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTERGRATION 17 (1982).
68. See Act No. 903, Respecting Equality of Treatment as Between Men and Women in
Questions of Employment, 343 Gazette Ufficiale della Republica Italiana, [Gaz. Uff.] 9014
(1977) (Italy), reprinted in 2 ILO LEGIS. SERIES, at It. 1 (1978).
69. Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act, 1974, supra note 59, amended by the Employment
Equality Act, 1977, ACTS OF THE OIREACHTAS (Republic of Ireland), reprinted in ILO LEGIS.
SERIES, at Ire. 1. See also N. WAYNE, LABOUR LAW IN IRELAND 160-307 (1980). The Irish
Department of Labour is, at the time of this writing, preparing proposals for new legislation.




many, and the Netherlands were not pursued. This was due to the May
1978 repeal of a discriminatory provision in France that provided for
accommodation allowances limited to the "head of household; "o70 to the
adoption by Germany of a satisfactory law in August 1980;71 and to the
extension of equal pay rights to the public service in a Dutch law of July
1980.72
Cases against Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Great Britain
were subsequently brought before the ECJ. Those involving Belgium
and Luxembourg challenged the different conditions for men and women
attaching to the head of household allowances in the public service of
these two countries. The Commission withdrew the case against
Belgium following legislative changes and won the cases against Luxem-
bourg73 and the United Kingdom. 74 Luxembourg75 and the United
Kingdom76 have since adopted new legislation, which provides that equal
pay applies only to the "same work," and not to work of "equal value."77
70. The French law has since been largely amended. See Act No. 83-635 to Amend the
Labour Code and the Penal Code as to Equality in Employment Between Women and Men,
1983 Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise [J.O.] 2176, reprinted in 2 ILO LEGIS. SE-
RIES, at Fr. 2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as French Equal Pay Law]. This has been supple-
mented by Circular of 2 May 1984 on the Application of Law No. 83-635 of July 1983,
reprinted and translated in 131 EUR. INDUS. REL. REP. 27 (1983).
71. See Act Respecting Equality of Treatment for Men and Women at the Workplace and
the Maintenance of Claims in the Event of the Transfer of Establishments [Labour Law (Euro-
pean Communities Harmonisation) Act], 1980 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1 [BGBl] 48 (W. Ger.),
reprinted in 2 ILO LEGIS. SERIES, at Ger. F.R. 3 (1981).
72. See Act of 2 July 1980 (Equal Treatment of Men and Women in the Civil Service Act).
This supplements the primary Act to Lay Down Rules for the Entitlement of Workers to a
Wage that is Equal to the Wage Earned by Workers of the Other Sex for Work of Equal Value,
129 Staatsblad voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 1975 (Netherlands), reprinted in 2
ILO LEGIS. SERIES, at Neth. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Netherlands Equal Wage Act].
73. Commission of the European Communities v. Luxembourg (Case 58/81), 1982 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2175.
74. Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom (Case 61/81), 1982 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2601.
75. Act of Apr. 20, 1983, amending Grand Ducal Regulation of July 10, 1974 (Lux.).
76. Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations, 1983 STAT. INST. No. 1784, amending the
Equal Pay Act, supra note 51. Northern Ireland has separate legislation that provides almost
exactly similar terms. The Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations, STAT. R & O.N. IR. No. 16
(1984), amending the Equal Pay Act, STAT. R. & O.N. IR. No. 32 (1970). The British provi-
sions are examined in greater detail in McCrudden, Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value: The
Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983, 12 INDUs. L.J. 197 (1983). In addition, a set of
regulations introduces special procedures by which equal value claims are to be heard and
decided. These are examined in McCrudden, Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value (cont.), 13
INDUS. L.J. 50 (1984). The legislation has been the subject of a large and expanding academic
and legal literature. See Szyszczak, Pay Inequalities and Equal Value Claims, 48 MOD. L.
REV. 139 (1985); M. RUBENSTEIN, EQUAL PAY FOR WORK OF EQUAL VALUE (1984); Town-
shend-Smith, Legislation: The Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983, 47 MOD. L. REV.
201 (1984).
77. Act Respecting Equal Wages for Men and Women, Law No. 32 (1976) (Den.), re-
printed in 2 ILO LEGIS. SERIES, at Den. 1 (1976).
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The Danish government argued that the Danish term for "same work"
had wider application than assumed by the Commission, but the Com-
mission contested this argument. The Commission also won this case.78
Greece adopted legislation in 1981, shortly after joining the
Community.79
The infringement proceeding against the United Kingdom by the Eu-
ropean Commission is the most interesting for the purposes of this Arti-
cle. The Commission argued that women, under British law, could not
obtain equal pay for work of value equal to that of their male counter-
parts unless job evaluations were conducted in their individual compa-
nies. Therefore, the United Kingdom was not properly fulfilling its
obligations under the 1975 Equal Pay Directive. 0 The United Kingdom,
however, countered that such an argument was inconsistent with the
wording of article I of the Directive because it overlooked the words "to
which equal value is attributed." 81 Article I did not give employees, the
United Kingdom argued, the right to insist on having pay determined by
a job classification scheme. Furthermore, the United Kingdom argued
that the practical considerations involved in implementing the Commis-
sion's compulsory job evaluation interpretation, compared with the ad-
vantages under the system then in use in the United Kingdom, had a
bearing on whether the interpretation contended for by the Commission
was likely to be that subscribed to by all Members of the Council in the
Directive.
In response to this argument,8 2 the Commission reviewed the different
systems adopted by the Member States. It pointed out that in Belgium,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and West Germany, many problems were
resolved by "works inspectorates." Where a question was reserved for
the courts, the courts were not necessarily bound by the results of the job
evaluation schemes. In the Netherlands, the question whether work was
of equal value was assessed through a reliable system of job evaluation.
Under the Irish legislation, which the Commission "believe[d] to be an
example of how the United Kingdom could comply with its obliga-
tions"8 3 under the Directive, any dispute on the subject of equal pay
78. Commission of the European Communities v. Denmark (Case 143/83) (judgment of
Jan. 31, 1985) (slip op. on file with the author).
79. 1981 Law on Equality, Act No. 1414, Respecting the Application of the Principle of
Equality of the Sexes in Employment Relationships, reprinted in 2 ILO LEGIS. SERIES, at Gr,
1.
80. Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom (Case 61/81), 1982 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2601, 2602.
81. Id. at 2606.
82. Id. at 2608.




could be referred to an Equality Officer who, after investigating, would
issue a recommendation.
In rendering its 1982 judgment, the ECJ disagreed with the British
arguments and required Britain to pass new legislation allowing women
to claim equal pay for work which, though apparently different on its
face from jobs performed by men, was of equal value to that work as
assessed by judicial proceedings. Both the judgment of the ECJ, and
even more explicitly the opinion of the Advocate General Verloren Van
Themaat, left open which specific type of system had to be adopted:
It is not for the Court to indicate how the United Kingdom should adapt its
legislation in order to ensure that the principle of equal pay for work of
equal value is actually applied in every case. It is important to note that in
this matter the Member States must moreover take account of their "na-
tional circumstances and legal systems" as stated in Article 6 of the Direc-
tive. It is precisely in this area that the practice of Member States differed
greatly owing to the greater or lesser amount of freedom enjoyed by the two
sides of industry.84
II. The Substantive Law of Equal Value
In this part, I will examine the statutory and case law of the EEC
Member States85 and address the five questions set out in the introduc-
tion. First, what does "equal value" mean? Second, what is the scope of
comparison (which jobs may be compared)? Third, What, if any, de-
fenses are available to an employer to justify differences in remuneration
between men and women engaged in work of equal value? Fourth, which
benefits provided by an employer to her employees should be regarded as
pay, and thus subject to the equality principle? Fifth, what is the rela-
tionship between the equal value requirement and collective agreements?
I hope that this examination will clarify the many parallels between the
EEC Member States' experiences with comparable worth and the likely
experience of the United States in this area.
Before doing so, however, two caveats must be discussed briefly. First,
although I shall not examine in detail how equal value is implemented,
the mechanics of implementation and litigation are crucial to the likely
operational effect and development of the equal value standard. 6 Sec-
84. Id. at 2624.
85. This study will not, however, discuss the laws of Spain or Portugal, which joined the
EEC in 1985.
86. The content of the procedures in Ireland and the United Kingdom illustrates three
important features of an evolving European approach to implementing the equal value stan-
dard. First, the task of implementing the standard has been given to the already existing,
specialized labor institutions (the Irish Labour Court and the British industrial tribunals and
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ond, an examination of how the courts of the Member States have ad-
dressed themselves to some basic questions does not tell us very much
about how effective the equal pay laws are in practice. Progressive legal
interpretations do not necessarily translate into comparative wage
rates.8 7
Central Arbitration Committee). This has been done not only because of their relatively infor-
mal method of adjudication and their "tripartite composition" (i.e., one with representatives of
management and labor, plus an "independent"), but also because equal pay is regarded largely
as a labor law issue rather than as a quasi-constitutional issue as in the United States. Second,
there has been a concern to introduce into these procedures extra elements which, in the lan-
guage of recent American legal literature, reflect a preference for "alternative dispute resolu-
tion" and "managerial judging." See ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BANE OR BOON
TO ATTORNEYS? (L. Ray ed. 1982) (complied by Special Committee of the American Bar
Association). In particular, this is reflected in the use of Equality Officers in Ireland and "in-
dependent experts" in Britain to carry out initial assessments of "value." Third, a tension has
evolved in the crafting of a system of enforcement between those who consider equal value
claims as essentially "individual" and those who consider them "collective," as the issue is
discussed in Britain, or between those who view them as "disputes of right" and those who
characterize them as "disputes of interest," as it is discussed in Ireland.
87. The amount of litigation is one indication of the degree of change occurring in the
Member States. If the experience of the United States can be generalized in this area, litigation
tends to increase as inequality is perceived to be a problem. Low rates of litigation may reflect
lack of change. If this is the case, then the comparatively small amount of litigation on equal
pay throughout Member States is a cause of concern.
In the Report of the Commission to the Council on the Application as of February 12, 1978
of the Principle of Equal Pay for Men and Women, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Doc. No. 711
final (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 REPORT], several Member States reported the amount of
equal pay litigation up to 1979. The Belgian government believed that there were few cases; in
Denmark, no case had been brought before the courts; in France, three cases reached the
highest court, the Court of Cassation; West Germany could not state the number of actions
since specific statistics for such actions did not exist,- but it indicated that judgments of the
Federal Labor Courts in this area were rare; and finally, though the Italian government could
not determine the exact number of actions brought, ten judgments were delivered in the rele-
vant period. Even in Ireland and Britain, where the amount of litigation is substantially higher
than in other Member States, it is almost insignificant in comparison with, for example, unfair
dismissal claims. See generally Equal Value Round-Up, 4 EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES REVIEW 6
(1985) [hereinafter cited as EQ. Opp. REV.].
Various reasons have been given for this phenomenon: lack of awareness of the legal provi-
sions; resolution of disputes through collective bargaining; women workers' fear of taking ac-
tion given the possibility of retaliation by employers; lack of awareness of the discrimination by
the women themselves; difficulty of proving discrimination; absence of help for women in tak-
ing cases; and a lack of interest by trade unions in the issue. One individual has argued that
there has been a "marked shift throughout the Community from litigation over equal pay to
disputes over discrimination concerning other conditions of employment, especially access to
employment, and dismissal and redundancy. These are topics of great concern in a period of
recession and unemployment." See Landau, Sexual Equality in Employment in the EEC, 123
INT'L LAB. REV. 53, 63 (1984).
In addition to the more obvious explanations for the low rates of litigation, a recurring
theme in studies of this issue is that women, their unions, and their legal advisors often do not
perceive the legal system as a way to tackle the undervaluation of women's work. The availa-
bility of a relatively sophisticated legal remedy for such discrimination may therefore be con-
siderably ahead of women's perception of what law can do. This attitude should not be
regarded as arising from ignorance or wrong-headedness. Similarly, among academic legal
commentators there is a perception that legal means of redress must, almost of necessity, be
relatively limited in what they can achieve. See Landau, supra, at 67-68. As law is used to
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A. "Equal Value" Considered
1. The Meaning of "Value"
In theory, the "value" of a job can be assessed in at least three ways.
First, one might look at the market value of a job. This, clearly, is not
the meaning intended by the principle of "equal pay for work of equal
value," and this definition has not been adopted in the case law or legisla-
tion of any Member State. A second concept of value is marginal pro-
ductivity, or the value that the work adds to the total output of the
enterprise. Finally, a third approach would look to the job's "content."
Whether the second method of assessing value should be adopted was
litigated only in Italy. During the 1960's, several Italian courts upheld
the practice of underpaying women on the grounds that their work was,
on average, less productive than the corresponding work of men. The
Court of Cassation subsequently decided, however, that the concept of
equal value referred not to equal output, the second approach, but rather
to equal job content, the third approach.88 This third approach has since
been adopted in all Member States, either by legislation or through case
law.
2. Value: Facial Similarity or Underlying Similarity
A consensus appears to be developing on a number of further ques-
tions including, most importantly, whether two jobs, dissimilar on their
face, may nonetheless be regarded as equal based on a job content test.
The earlier British Equal Pay Act of 1970 adopted a "like work" stan-
dard.8 9 This was defined as work that was "the same" or of a "broadly
similar" nature, where the differences were "not of practical importance
in relation to terms and conditions of employment." 90 In considering
"like work," British tribunals compared the job content of the work of
men and women to assess whether jobs were the same or broadly similar
on their face, without considering their underlying value.91 This was
broader than the "same work" test but narrower than an approach to
"equal value" that would allow comparison of jobs with different con-
tackle the more ingrained structural discrimination in pay, this issue is likely to come more
into prominence.
88. See Spa Costruzioni Mecchanidre Cerlani v. Maffi, No. 1231 of Apr. 18, 1969; Saletti
v. Soc. Lauificio Fratelli Sbracci, No. 707 of Mar. 17, 1970; Soc. Alemagna Panettoni v. Bus-
setta, No. 672 of Mar. 12, 1974; Soc. paz. Ceschina Sauilaria & C. v. Delvo, No. 2188 of June
14, 1976; Cesdrin v. Giacometti, No. 1593 of Apr. 25, 1977. See also Morgenstern, Women
Workers and the Courts, 112 INT'L LAB. REv. 15, 20 (1975).
89. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
90. Equal Pay Act, supra note 51, § 1(4).
91. See, eg., Capper Press Ltd. v. Lawton, [1977] 1 Q.B. 852; Waddington v. Leicester
Council for Voluntary Services, [1977] 2 All E.R. 633; Dugdale v. Kraft Foods Ltd., [1977] 1
All E.R. 454.
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tent. The legislation passed after the infringement proceedings by the
European Commission incorporated this wider approach into British
law, and permitted jobs to be compared "for instance [under such head-
ings as] effort, skill, [and] decision," even if the employer had carried out
no such assessment in the past.92
The requirement of the new legislation 93 has been interpreted by the
industrial tribunals to rule out reliance solely on non-analytical systems
of job evaluation such as rating, job classification, and paired compari-
son. Instead, the tribunals have emphasized factor analysis, which may
be carried out with or without attaching points which is known as the
"points method." The points method breaks down each job into factors,
most commonly including skill, responsibility, physical and mental re-
quirements, and working conditions. An independent expert awards
points or grades for each evaluated/significant factor, and the total
number of points decides the comparative value of the job.94 This ap-
proach to the meaning of "value" also appears to be the most commonly
accepted method in judicial and administrative decisions interpreting na-
tional equal pay legislation in other Member States. Two examples, re-
cent British cases, illustrate the approach and indicate the current
practical effects of equal value legislation.
In Hayward v. Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd.,95 an independent ex-
pert devised a version of the factor comparison method. The jobs under
consideration were viewed as the source of a number of key "demands"
upon those who performed them. To reflect these demands, unweighted
factors were selected, each having some relationship to job difficulty or
value. The expert tried to avoid overlap of factors to prevent double-
counting features of the jobs. To reach a decision when comparing the
applicant's job with another job, judgments were made about whether
demand under each factor was at one of three levels: low, moderate, or
high. The five factors chosen were: (a) physical demands, or "the need
for physical effort and stamina and the application of human energy in
applying the skills necessary to the performance of the tasks; 96
(b) environmental demands, "which arise from the physical conditions of
the work station, and the general conditions of work which apply to the
job holder in that job, for example noise, cold, dust, fumes, wetness, heat
92. Equal Pay Act, supra note 51, § 1(5). See also supra note 76.
93. See supra note 76.
94. Considerable flexibility is permitted in the way in which the independent expert carries
out his or her responsibilities. In particular, the expert has discretion over the techniques to be
used and the choice of factors. Other than through appellate decisions, no attempt has been
made to ensure uniformity of approach.
95. [1984] INDUS. REL. L. REP. 463. The expert's report is published in part in 330 IN-
DUS. REL. Rav. & REp. 14 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Expert's Report].
96. Expert's Report, supra note 95, at 330.
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and humidity;" 97 (c) planning and decisionmaking demands, "the dy-
namic element in carrying out the decisions related to the work tasks
including reasoning, thinking and judgment, the level of discretion, the
level of supervision received;" 98 (d) skill and knowledge demands, "the
depth and breadth of knowledge required for doing the actual job as indi-
cated by possession of recognized training and qualifications;" 99 and
(e) responsibility demands "for tools, equipment and materials." 1 0
The woman applicant and the males with whom she was comparing
herself (the comparators) were all employed by the same company, Cam-
mell Laird Shipyard in Birkenhead. All were members of the General
Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trade Unions (GMBATU). The
applicant, a cook in the workers' cafeteria, spent approximately 80% of
her time preparing meals, 15% cleaning and serving, and the remaining
5% doing miscellaneous work.
The comparators, who supported her claim, were shop stewards and
craftsmen engaged in shipbuilding trades. One was a painter, one was a
thermal insulation engineer, and one was a joiner. The independent ex-
pert received detailed submissions and held separate discussions and con-
sultations with both parties and their representatives, and with the
comparators. After encountering some difficulties, the expert requested
additional comparators. Beyond this, meetings were held in the work-
place where the expert conducted observational studies of the jobs under
consideration. A report was prepared comparing the two jobs under all
these factors. 10 1 On the basis of his calculation, the expert decided that
the applicant's work was of equal value to that of all three comparators.
The independent expert's method of evaluation was subsequently chal-
lenged before the industrial tribunal by Cammell Laird as "so simple as
to be crude and lacking in precision." 102 The attack was rejected by the
tribunal, which held that the legislation "does not appear to look for the
question of equal value to be dealt with by way of precise mathematical
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 331.
100. Id.
101. Taking the expert's assessments under each factor heading, the scoring may be sum-
marized as follows:
Factor heading Cook Painter Joiner Thermal Insula-
tion Engineer
Physical demands Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
Environmental demands Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
Planning and decisionmaking Moderate Low Low Low
demands
Skill and knowledge demands Equal Equal Equal Equal
Responsibility demands Low Moderate Moderate Low
102. Hayward v. Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd., [1984] INDUS. REL. L. REP. 463, 467.
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calculition."10 3 Looking broadly at the jobs' similarities and differences
was "consistent with industrial common sense." 1°4 There was, in the
legislation,
nowhere to be found a requirement to adopt any particular method of as-
sessment; had there been a desire on the part of the legislature that a partic-
ular method should be used it seems likely to us that a specific requirement
would have been made. We find that the method used was, in fact, ade-
quate for its particular purpose. Only if we considered that the expert had
gone badly wrong would we feel justified in interfering. We do not think
that he has done so. 105
In the second example, Wells v. F. Smales & Son (Fish Merchants)
Ltd.,10 6 fourteen women fish packers claimed that their work was of
equal value to that of a male laborer paid almost £6.00 more per week.
The independent expert who evaluated the claims found that the appli-
cants performed a range of tasks, and decided to examine the content of
the individual tasks performed by the packers and the comparator. Be-
cause of the variations in job patterns and the likely variations in value
between them, the expert decided to value the component tasks individu-
ally, and then calculate from these comparisons a set of "personal val-
ues" reflecting the proportion of time spent on each. He spent nearly two
weeks at the factory.
The four main factors considered were: a) skill and experience, which
embraces "all matters involving expenditure of time by the worker in
fitting himself/herself for the job;"10 7 b) responsibility, "limited to prod-
uct materials, plant and equipment;" 10 8 c) working conditions, "covering
unpleasant or inimical surroundings, hazard and similar conditions;" 10 9
and d) effort of various kinds. Each of these four factors was divided into
eight subdivisions. The expert originally wished to avoid attaching nu-
merical values to the assessments "because this can give an impression of
accuracy which is not justified by the subjective nature of the basic judg-
ments,"110 but he decided that some form of numerical value would have
to be used to apply the percentages shown in the time assessments. The
"simplest method" ' was to use values from zero to eight, that is two
units for each main level within each factor.
103. Id. at 469.
104. Id. at 470.
105. Id.
106. 2 EQ. Opp. REv. 24 (Indus. Tribunal 1985).
107. Id. at 31.
108. Id.
109. d at 32.
110. Id.




The valuations were carried out within sub-factors for each of the thir-
teen individual jobs and that of the comparator. Scores for the relevant
sub-factors were then added to obtain total scores for each main factor.
Percentages of time spent on each job by each applicant and the compa-
rator were then applied, and a total numerical score was calculated for
each applicant and the comparator under each main factor. Finally, val-
ues for all four main factors were added together to obtain a total score
for each applicant and the comparator. 112
The scores indicated that nine applicants had higher scores than the
comparator's. Five applicants scored between 79% and 95% of the com-
parator. The expert concluded that the nine applicants who scored
higher than the comparator were employed on work of equal value but
the five applicants who scored lower were not. The industrial tribunal,
however, held that all the applicants held jobs of equal value to the com-
parator since they scored "so closely that the difference between them
and the comparator are not relevant or make real material differences
[sic]."1 1 3 The industrial tribunal in effect accepted the expert's method,
agreed with the majority of the expert's conclusions, and determined that
the female applicants' claims justified raising their wages and awarding
them back pay. 14 These two examples illustrate an approach, the points
method, that may be used to compare two or more facially dissimilar
jobs in order to evaluate the equivalent job content for equal pay
purposes.
3. How "Equal" is "Equal"?
A different problem is how the word "equal" is to be interpreted. The
legislative provisions of every Member State except for the Netherlands
speak of equal pay for work of equal value. The Netherlands provides
that, for calculation purposes, in the absence of a male worker doing
work of equal value, work of approximately equal value will suffice.' 15
Even a standard of equality may be flexible. In Wells v. Smales,116 the
industrial tribunal took a realistic approach to the problem of equality.
Other courts have not been as flexible or have confronted situations
where even a realistic approach could not allow a finding of equality. 1 7
112. Id. at 35.
113. Id. at 30.
114. Id.
115. Netherlands Equal Wage Act, supra note 72, § 3(1).
116. 2 EQ. Opp. REv. 24 (Indus. Tribunal 1985).
117. See, ag., Brown & Royle v. Cearns & Brown Ltd., 6 EQ. Opp. REv. 27 (Indus. Tribu-
nal 1985).
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For Member States, two further problems have arisen in interpreting
the word "equal." One problem arises where the value of the woman's
job is higher than that of the man's job yet she is paid less. In a number
of cases, the Irish Labour Court has held that where the job demands on
the claimant are higher than those made on her comparator, her work
could not be described as being "equal" in value, and the woman was
thus unsuccessful even though her job was more than equal.1 18 The sec-
ond problem is the reverse of this: A woman performs job A, which is
less skilled and less responsible than job B filled by a man, yet the woman
earns less than the man would were he doing job A. The Irish Labour
Court has held that Irish law provides no remedy for this situation.1 19
These problems remain largely unresolved in most Member States.
4. Total Package Approach
To some extent, the effect of the limitations discussed above are eased
by the agreement in Member States that different factors may be bal-
anced against each other. 120 In Ireland, for example, one may balance
the demands of physical work against the concentration required in par-
ticular skills. This has become known as the "total package" approach.
The case in which this approach was first used, Pauwels Trafo Ltd. and
15 Women Winding Machine Operators,1 21 best illustrates the "total
package" concept. The Equality Officer concluded that there was "no
method" to determine
with mathematical precision if the equation between each woman's work
and the man's work comes out exactly the same. The Equality Officer
118. Department of Agriculture and ITGWU, Determination Under the Anti-Discrimina-
tion (Pay) Act No. 6-79 [hereinafter cited as DEP No.], THE LABOUR COURT, 33d ANNUAL
REPORT (1979) [hereinafter cited as LAB. CT. ANN. REP. with volume and year]; 29 Female
Employees and A Board Telecom, DEP No. 6-84, 38 LAB. CT. ANN. REP. (1984); One Female
Employee v. Arthur Guinness Son & Co. (Dublin), DEP No. 11-83, 37 LAB. CT. ANN. REP.
(1983). The claimants in the Guinness case have appealed to the High Court. Nesbitt, supra
note 69, at 10, col. 3.
119. See, eg., Department of Agriculture and ITGWU, DEP No. 6-79, 33 LAB. Cr. ANN.
REP. (1979). It also appears that British law gives no remedy for such wage discrimination.
During the consultation on the drafting of the new legislation, the Union Trade Congress
pressed for a definition of equal value that would eliminate all possible discrimination from any
aspects or conditions of employment that related to the sex of the worker concerned. Its com-
ments reiterated the organization's earlier British law of a "national man" test. This test
would consider, in circumstances in which work was exclusively or predominately performed
by females, what the rate of pay would be for male employees with the same or substantially
similar skills, responsibility and service carrying out the work under the same or substantially
similar degrees of effort.
120. For a discussion of the theoretical problems of aggregating interfactor comparisons,
see generally, A. MACKAY, ARROW'S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SERIAL CHOICE 61-77
(1980). I am grateful to Les Green for this reference.
121. Recommendation Issued by Equal Pay Officers, No. 48/81, 35 LAB. CT. ANN. REP.
(1981) [hereinafter cited as EP No.].
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must, therefore, take a practical approach to the work under examination
and determine whether the total package of every individual's work under
examination can be reckoned as being of equal value.122
Similarly, a recent French government circular interprets the 1983
French law's definition of equal value as providing that "equality of value
must be recognized whenever, despite the differences between the jobs
being compared, each job, when assessed globally, involves a comparable
aggregate of knowledge and skills .... ,"123 Thus, while there are many
difficulties inherent in the term "equal value," there are suggestions and
solutions that can go a long way toward resolving the most troublesome
of these difficulties.
B. The Scope of Comparison
The second major issue concerning the substantive law of equal value
concerns the scope of comparison in comparable worth evaluations. In
other words, which employers, facilities, and job descriptions can be
reached by equal pay legislation? Theoretically, comparison between
men and women124 is possible in numerous circumstances: between
groups in the same establishment or the same undertaking; between
groups in enterprises in the same industry or occupation; between all
other employees with similar levels of pay or movements in pay, as
shown by earnings surveys or indices of earnings. 125
Despite this range of possibilities, Member States have actually
adopted a limited scope of comparison. Under British legislation, the
men and women compared must work in the "same employment;" 1 26
that is, they must be employed by the same employer in the same estab-
lishment. Section 1 of the Equal Pay Act permits comparison with men
in another establishment of the same employer only if "common terms
and conditions of employment are observed" at the two establishments.
Comparison may also be made with employees at establishments of other
employers where there are common terms and conditions, but only if the
122. Id.
123. See supra note 70. In Britain, the Hayward and Wells cases adopt a similar approach.
See supra notes 95-114 and accompanying text.
124. All Member States apparently permit male and female claimants to make an equal
value complaint and do not specifically require a male to be employed in a female-dominated
occupation before being eligible as a claimant. However, a claim by a male in a non-female-
dominated occupation is likely to be defended easily by an employer under the material factor
and equivalent defenses, see infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. The Ontario Green
Paper proposes to restrict the coverage of Ontario legislation to allow only female employees
and employees in female-dominated occupations to maintain claims. ONTARIO GREEN PA-
PER, supra note 12, at 18-19.
125. See Kessler, Comparability, in PAY POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 85 (1981).
126. Equal Pay Act, supra note 51, § l(b).
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employers are "associated." Such association occurs if one is a company
that the other (directly or indirectly) controls or if both are companies
that a third person controls.1 27
Selecting the appropriate comparisons within the establishment is diffi-
cult and very important to the applicant's success. Recent British indus-
trial tribunal decisions have, however, given some assistance here. In one
case, a "nursery nurse" employed by the local authority claimed that her
work was equal in value to that of higher paid male clerical workers.
The tribunal granted discovery. 128 The Employment Appeal Tribunal
upheld this order, reasoning that the woman had a prima facie case of
disparity because of a joint recommendation by the employers and the
union admitting that there was a disparity in the local authority's com-
parison between nursery nurses and nursery staff. As a result of these
discovery orders, eleven male employees were nominated as compara-
tors. Though she was successful at the discovery stage, the nurse lost at
the preliminary stage before the industrial tribunal.12 9 The applicant and
comparators had a common employer, but they were not employed at an
establishment where "common terms and conditions of employment"
were observed for employees of the relevant groups. The contractual
terms relating to work hours and holidays of the employees were suffi-
ciently different to go "to the heart" of the contracts. 30
The Irish Anti-Discrimination Pay Act provides that "a woman...
employed in any place... shall be entitled to the same rate of remunera-
tion as a man who is employed in that place by the same employer (or an
associated employer... ), if both are employed in like work," and that
"place includes a city, town or locality."' 31 The inclusion of the "place"
restriction in the Act was designed to ensure that legitimate regional dif-
ferences in pay would not be disturbed. The restriction may prevent a
female worker from bringing a claim where there is no male comparator
127. See, e.g., Hasley v. Fair Employment Agency, EP No. 8/85 (unreported Northern
Ireland Industrial Tribunal decision, Sept. 9, 1985).
128. Clwyd County Council v. Leverton, [1985] INDUS. REL. REP. 197. See also Langley
v. Beecham Proprietaries (unreported industrial tribunal decision, Nos. 2321/85 to 2335/85,
Aug. 29, 1985), digested at 4 EQ. OPP. R.Ev. 45 (1985).
129. The employer argued that the comparators nominated were unsuitable because the
grades with which the comparison was made were filled mainly by females. The tribunal
found that though a majority of the employees in the grades were female, a significant number
were male. The eleven comparators were not remote exceptions, and comparison was appro-
priate. See Clwyd County Council v. Leverton, [1985] INDUS. REL. REP. 197.
130. Id.





in the same "place," but where there would be a comparator in the same
employment if the constraint on place were removed. 132
While a centralized agreement applying to all employees does not
make their place of work necessarily "the same," neither do different
agreements for workers employed in the same place necessarily mean
that those employees cannot be compared. For example, in a 1981 case,
the work of employees in three separate establishments was consid-
ered. 133 The employer argued that because the wage agreement with the
catering staff in one place differed from that with the catering staff at the
other two, the duties of the staff at the first could not validly be compared
with the staff duties at the other two. The Equality Officer rejected the
employer's arguments, and found the comparison valid.
A similar issue arose in France in the Essilor case134 under a 1972
equal pay law. In 1981, the court ruled that French equal pay legislation
did not apply where an undertaking ("enterprise") failed to provide equal
pay for the same work or work of equal value done by employees work-
ing in different plants ("6tablissements") in locations about sixty-one
miles apart. The court noted that the management at the two plants
operated independently of each other and that terms and conditions of
employment were distinct. New French legislation, on the other hand,
now provides that "differences in remuneration between establishments
of a single undertaking may not be based on the fact that the workers of
such establishments belong to either sex." 135 According to a French gov-
ernment circular, this legislation "allows employees to contest before the
tribunal any difference in pay based on sex, found between the distinct
establishments of one and the same undertaking."1 36
The requirement of common employment appears to prevent women
from comparing themselves with contract workers employed indirectly
by their employer. This is particularly noteworthy since, if equal value is
effectively enforced, companies may use such contract workers to avoid
comparison between men and women in different types of jobs. Nor do
132. Irish Transport and General Workers Union, DEP No. 8-84, 38 LAB. C. ANN. REP.
(1984). See also Midland Health Board and Stokes, EP No. 26/82, 36 LAB. Cr. ANN. REP.
(1982); Department of Posts & Telegraphs and Six Telephone Officers, EP No. 9/83, 37 LAB.
Cr. ANN. REP. (1983). But see PMPA and Three Women Insurance Officials, EP No. 29/81,
35 LAB. Cr. ANN. REP. (1981).
133. Ostlanna Iompair, Eireann Teo. and Nine Female Employees, EP No. 38-81, 35 LAB.
CT. ANN. REp. (1981).
134. [1982] Cass. civ. soc., Arret N. 1.179 (Cass.) (Apr. 11, 1980); Bull. Civ. Arret N.
1.180 (Rejet), Pourvoi N. 81-40.347 (Jan. 23, 1981).
135. French Equal Pay Law, supra note 70, § 5.
136. French Gov't Circular on Equal Pay, para. 1.3.2 (French Gov't Publishing Office
1985) (copy on file with the author).
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these approaches give much hope to women employed in homeworking
where work is done for an employer at the home of the worker herself, or
to those women employed by small, single establishment employers in
work places where few or no men work and where the types of jobs are
limited.
In contrast to the limited comparison of jobs available under British,
Irish, and French law, Dutch law provides:
[W]here no work of equal or approximately equal value is done by a worker
of the other sex in the undertaking where the worker concerned is em-
ployed, the basis shall be the wage that a worker of the other sex normally
receives, in an undertaking of as nearly as possible the same kind in the
same section [of industry]." 137
These differences illustrate that the debate as to how far equal pay legis-
lation should allow comparison between jobs is a continuing one. The
resolution of the issue in favor of a broad or narrow permitted compari-
son is likely to be a crucial element in determining whether the equal
value standard will have a marked or a relatively limited effect.
C. The Employer's Defense
Now I turn to the third major issue: What, if any, defenses may an
employer use to justify differences in remuneration between a man and a
woman engaged in work of equal value in the sense of equal in job con-
tent? Legislation in all the Member States-except for Ireland, the
United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany-does not ex-
plicitly specify available defenses. In Ireland, employers may justify a
variation if they can show "grounds other than sex"138 for a disputed
variation in pay. In Britain, employers will succeed if they can prove a
137. Netherlands Equal Wage Act, supra note 72, § 3(2). The European Commission's
1979 Report on the implementation of the principle of equal pay argued that the 1975 Direc-
tive required a wider comparison than that of just the "same establishment." Rather, "[t]he
'value of the work' of the two posts or duties which are to be compared must therefore be
established, where there is in the undertaking or undertakings in question no appropriate sys-
tem for reevaluating jobs, simply 'on an equitable basis' having regard to the available data,"
and in accordance with the terms used in the Dutch law. 1979 REPORT, supra note 87, at 140.
See generally Crisham, The Equal Pay Principle: Some Recent Decisions of the European
Court of Justice, 18 COMMON MKT. Rnv. 601 (1981); Plender, Equal Pay for Men and Wo-
men: Two Recent Decisions of the European Court, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 627 (1982).
To extend the scope of the Act to allow comparison with an employee in another employer's
establishment would inevitably necessitate answering a number of questions, including
whether there should be restrictions on the geographical area of comparison, clarification of
what types of employment are comparable, and specification of which method of comparison is
to be adopted. See Szyszczak, Pay Inequalities and Equal Value Claims, 48 MoD. L. REV.
139, 150-57 (1985).




"genuine material factor which is not the difference of sex." 139 This re-
places the earlier and more restrictive "material difference" defense of
the 1970 Act. In Germany, the employer must prove that "material rea-
sons unrelated to a particular sex" justify the differential. 140 Similarly,
the case law on valid employer defenses to complaints of unequal pay
also comes mainly from Britain and Ireland. 141
Employers have in the past raised a wide range of defenses. Some em-
ployers have argued that they receive different average profits from the
work that men perform than from the work that women do. But is this a
valid defense? There is general agreement in the case law that an em-
ployer may not claim as a defense that the claimant is a female and the
comparator is a male. Arguments have long been made that women are
statistically more likely to miss work, that they cost more to employ, and
that, therefore, they should be paid less. These arguments apparently
have not been accepted in any Member State as sufficient to defend
against a claim of a violation of equal pay legislation. However, other
defenses raised by employers have given rise to more variation in treat-
ment in the courts of various Member States.
1. Protective Provisions
A difficult problem arises when other legislative provisions or a collec-
tive agreement afford extra protection to women. Is the employer per-
mitted to justify a lower rate of remuneration on a quid pro quo basis?
The German Federal Labor Court was among the first to confront this
issue. In 1974, the court held that the prohibition of night work for wo-
men must not be used to weaken the principle of equal pay. 42 This ap-
proach has been incorporated in the German law of 1980.143 The courts
of some other Member States have adopted this approach. In Italy, the
Court of Cassation recently held that a lower rate of remuneration for
women could not be justified because of the working mother's statutory
right to be absent occasionally from work.144
139. Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations, supra note 76, § 1(3).
140. Gesetz uber die Gleuichbehandlung von Mannsrn und Frauen am Arbeitsplatz und
uber die Erbattung von Anspurchen bie Betriebsubergang (Arbeitsrechtliches EG-Anpassung-
sgesetz), Aug. 13, 1980, BGB1. I 1308, art. I(r)(1) ("nicht auf das Geschlect bezogene, Schliche
Grunde') [hereinafter cited as Arbeitsrechtliches EG-Anpassungesgsetz].
141. In Britain, all but two cases have been interpretations of the earlier "material differ-
ence" defense. There has been little case law on "material factor."
142. 5 AZR (Ger. Fed. Labor Ct.) 567-73 (Sept. 11, 1974).
143. Arbeitsrechtliches EG-Anpassungesgsetz, supra note 140, art. 1(3).
144. Sentence No. 42, Jan. 5, 1984; see Ballestrero, Equality Between Male and Female
Workers in Italian Law, in NATIONAL REPORTS, supra note 13, at 7.
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2. Personal Factors
In a number of cases, British courts have allowed an employer to jus-
tify lower pay to women because of other factors personal to the particu-
lar men or women being compared. Unequal pay has been held to be
justified by a number of personal differences such as: a different perform-
ance rating, where the rating was based on a system of performance ap-
praisals; seniority, where employees receive periodic pay increases based
on their tenure with the employer; and "red circling," a procedure
whereby the position of an employee is re-evaluated and, as a result,
downgraded, but his or her wages are temporarily fixed until the wages
appropriate to the downgraded position are equivalent to his or her
wages. 145
In these types of cases, the courts have been careful to scrutinize the
employer's justification. If the court finds that the personal difference
alleged is merely a pretext for intentional discrimination, or if intentional
discrimination was a causal element in the variation, the employer will
lose. Problems of interpretation have arisen, however. In particular,
there has been a question about whether an employer should be permit-
ted to rely on a material factor that has its roots in direct discrimination
in the past. The answer in this instance has, on the whole, been "no."
3. Grading Structure
In a number of Irish cases, an employer has argued that differential
pay resulted from women occupying a lower level on the company's
grading structure. Only where the grading structure is held not to be
sexpally discriminatory did the employer's argument succeed. In one
case, 146 the company introduced a unisex grading structure to replace a
discriminatory one. The claimants sought equal pay with female clerks
who were on the highest grade of the new scale. The claim failed. The
equality officer held that the salary scales of the claimants differed from
those of the women because they held different positions in the company
grading structure. The grading structure did not, at the time of the
claim, discriminate on the basis of sex; therefore, the differences between
the claimant's rates of remuneration and those of the two women were on
grounds other than sex.
When the grading structure is found to be discriminatory, the em-
ployer will not prevail. Particularly interesting are the factors taken by
145. See, e.g., Snoxell v. Vauxhall Motors Ltd., [1978] 1 Q.B. 11; Sun Alliance Ltd. v.
Dudman, 1978 INDUS. CAS. REp. 551; Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd., 1978 INDUS.
CAs. REP. 1159.





Irish equality officers to indicate a discriminatory grading structure.
Where only women are employed in the company's lowest paid grade
and where the work being performed by women is of equal value to work
performed by men, then an argument that the difference in pay is due to
the grading structure will rarely be accepted. 147
In some Irish cases, the continuing effect of past discrimination has
also invalidated the employer's argument. In one case, the Equality Of-
ficer concluded that:
the fact that only women are employed in the grade of carriage cleaners and
at a salary below that of any male workers in the grade structure shows an
obvious element of selective treatment. This perpetuates the situation as it
existed prior to the [equal pay legislation] one which the Act was designed
to remedy. 148
In another case, 149 the Labour Court held even more clearly that, though
the Act did not prohibit differences in pay based on different recruitment,
career, and promotion prospects, where the "difference in the basis of
recruitment was in the past related to the sex of the recruits,"' 50 the
court would not accept the employer's argument that pay differentials
were legitimately based on "grounds other than sex."' 151 This reasoning
should be adopted by any tribunal enforcing equal pay legislation so that
facially neutral selection criteria neither perpetuate the past effects of dis-
crimination nor mask new discrimination.
4. Disparate Impact
Perhaps the most difficult issue today in the implementation of equal
pay legislation arises when the courts consider an employer's attempt to
justify unequal pay by relying on factors that, though facially neutral,
have a disparate impact on women. Such a defense, in other words, dis-
proportionately disadvantages women as a group. The resolution of this
issue is vital to how broad the effective scope of equal pay legislation will
be. Though the courts of a number of Member States have considered
defenses that have a disparate impact, no common approach has yet
emerged in the national courts. Consideration of two specific issues illus-
trates the general problem: part-time workers and market forces.
147. Ostlanna Iompair, Eireann Teo. and Nine Female Employees, EP No. 38/81, 35 LAB.
Cr. ANN. REP. (1981).
148. C.I.E. and 6 Female Carriage Cleaners, EP No. 6/80 at 6, 34 LAB. Cr. ANN. REP.
(1980).
149. Irish Civil Service Building Society and Female Clerical Staff, DEP No. 7-78, 32 LAB.
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a. Part-time Work
Many of the most important cases concerning employer defenses relate
to the part-time worker issue. Given that part-time workers are more
often women than men, is it equitable or legal to pay part-time workers a
lower rate per-hour than full-time workers (usually male) who do the
same tasks? The Dutch Law of 1975 provides that "the wage to which
the worker would be entitled if in full-time employment shall be propor-
tionately reduced in so far as it is calculated on the basis of a unit to
time."'152 Most Member States, however, appear to leave this question to
the judiciary. 153
In one British case, a female part-time worker sought pay equal to that
received by male full-time workers. 154 The English Employment Appeal
Tribunal held that any difference in pay must be "objectively justified
even if this confers on employees greater rights than they would enjoy
under article 119 of the EEC Treaty."' 155 The tribunal therefore held
that to show a "material difference," an employer must show that the
lower pay for part-time workers is reasonably necessary to achieve some
justifiable objective other than a gender-related objective-for example,
greater efficiency. It would not be enough to show that the employer
intended to achieve this legitimate objective; the employer would have to
show that the different objective was actually achieved.
A recent Irish case took a similar approach.15 6 Nineteen part-time fe-
male employees working in a university college claimed a rate of pay
equal to that of a male colleague who worked full-time. The college did
not dispute that the claimants were engaged in work similar to the male
comparator's, but argued that his pay was greater because he worked
152. Netherlands Equal Wage Act, supra note 72, § 6.
153. Whether a pension provided by an employer to workers may lawfully exclude part-
time workers is the subject of continuing litigation in Germany. The Federal Labor Court has
referred a question relating to the requirements of the 1975 Directive, supra note 42 and ac-
companying text, and the EEC Treaty, supra note 14, to the EC. Since the case began, new
legislation relating to part-time work provides that proportional payment is required for part-
time work unless there are objectively justified reasons for the differences (e.g., payment for a
daily meal to full-time workers but not part-time workers who did not stay over lunchtime at
the plant), or unless provided for by the collective agreement. Such information was supplied
to the author by K. Bertelsmann.
154. The English Employment Appeal Tribunal (E.A.T.), initially referred the issue to the
European Court of Justice which replied somewhat ambiguously. See Jenkins v. Kingsgate
(Clothing Productions) Ltd., 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 911 (Preliminary Ruling). When the
ECJ judgment was considered by the E.A.T., the E.A.T. decided that it was possible for Brit-
ish law to confer greater rights on the woman than European law could confer. It thus applied
a more restrictive test to whether the employer could use, as a defense, the fact that a woman
worked part-time than the ECJ was prepared to do. 1981 INDUS. CAS. REP. 715.
155. 1980 INDUS. CAS. REP. 6.
156. St. Patrick's College, Maynooth and 19 Female Employees, EP No. 4/84, 38 LAB.
Cr. ANN. REP. (1984), recommendation upheld on different grounds, DEP No. 10-84, 38 LAB.




full-time, not because of sex differences. The dispute arose because of the
widespread practice throughout the Irish public service of not paying in-
cremental increases in pay to part-time workers. The equality officer ac-
cepted that the College's policy was not intended to reduce the pay of
women workers as such. Nevertheless, he considered that a requirement
to work full-time to qualify for a higher rate of pay could possibly consti-
tute sex discrimination. He reasoned that "a substantially greater pro-
portion of men than women are in practice able to work full-time because
of difficulties encountered by women with children, and not generally by
men, in arranging to work on that basis." 157 The equality officer
continued:
[I]n considering whether the College's practice of paying the claimants a
lower rate of pay because they work part-time is actually indirectly discrim-
inatory on the basis of sex, it seems relevant... to consider whether the
practice is essential for some [other] reason which is objectively justifiable
on grounds which do not discriminate in any way on the basis of sex. 158
b. Market Forces159
Employers have also pointed to market forces as reasons for differ-
ences in remuneration. They have argued that it is necessary to maintain
a balance between the internal wage structure and the external wage
structure. The employer is, in effect, claiming that external job-for-job
comparison should be used to limit internal factor comparison, which
otherwise would conclude that two "different" jobs generally compen-
sated differently should instead be paid equal wages.
Interpreting the earlier "material difference" defense in the British
Equal Pay Act, Lord Denning on the Court of Appeal 160 confined the
defense to the "personal equation of the woman as compared to that of
the man," 161 such as much longer length of service, or superior skill or
qualification, or greater output or productivity, or "red circling." The
court, however, would not consider in its analysis any extrinsic forces
that led to the man being paid more. An employer could not avoid his
obligation under the Act by saying, "I paid him more because he asked
for more," or "I paid her less because she was willing to work for less."
If any such excuses were permitted, Lord Denning held, "the Act would
be a dead letter. Those are the very reasons why there was unequal pay
157. Id. at EP No. 4/84, para. 32.
158. Id.
159. In addition to the scholarly articles cited, supra notes 76 & 137, see Market Factor
Defence, 5 EQ. Opp. REv. 9 (1986); Schofield, A Material Factor-Defences to Claims for
Equal Pay, 47 MOD. L. Rv. 740 (1984).
160. Clay Cross v. Fletcher, [1979] 1 All E.R. 474.
161. Id. at 477.
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before the statute. They are the very circumstances in which the statute
was intended to operate." 162
Since that case, however, the authority of this rejection of the "market
forces" argument has been weakened. In a more recent case, 163 a Scot-
tish appeals court upheld an employer's market forces defense. A Health
Board argued that the almost £3,000 difference between a male prosthe-
tist and a woman claimant was justified because she had been recruited
directly into the National Health Sevice, whereas he had transferred in at
the higher rate that he had previously enjoyed in the private sector.
Although all of the prosthetists at the higher rate were men, and all but
one at the lower rate were women, the majority of the court upheld the
differential because it was essential to recruit from the private sector at
higher rates in order to staff the service.
Two more recent cases on "equal value," in which the market forces
argument has been used, provide some limited additional guidance. In
one, the tribunal declared that where an employer claimed he had relied
on economic factors or market forces, no evidence had actually been ad-
duced to prove those factors, "even were they permissible considera-
tions, which we do not consider is the case." 164 In a second case, an
employer argued at the preliminary hearing that a genuine material fac-
tor defense was available because the nursery services provided by the
local authority were not statutorily required. 165 Accordingly, if an order
by the tribunal substantially increased the expense to local authorities of
employing nursery nurses, such an increase could reduce such services
available to the community. The tribunal was "skeptical" about that ar-
gument for two reasons: it "could be construed as being in terrorem of
the tribunal;" and "market forces" arguments were "less clearly capable"
of being a material factor.166 The tribunal did not consider that it was
appropriate to reach a final decision on that issue. It did, however, de-
cide that it was for the employer
to show that the factor upon which they rely was reasonably necessary to
achieve some objective other than an objective related to the sex of the
worker. It is too high a burden to call on them to prove necessity at one
extreme; while mere convenience on the other hand plainly would not
suffice. 167
162. Id.
163. Rainey v. Greater Glasgow Health Board, [1986] INDUS. REL. L. RFP. 414 (Court of
Session). For an interesting critique of the earlier E.A.T. decision, see Fredman, Market
Forces and Equal Pay: Rainey v. Greater Glasgow Health Board Eastern District, 13 INDUS.
L.J. 122 (1984).
164. Scott v. Beam College Ltd., 3 EQ. Opp. REv. 38, 40 (Indus. Tribunal 1985).
165. -Clwyd County Council v. Leverton, [1985] INDUS. REL. REP. 197.
166. Id. at 199.




Employers in the EEC thus have raised various defenses to claims
under equal pay legislation. The treatment of these defenses by tribunals
has differed from country to country, but generally they have scrutinized
these defenses carefully and have eliminated those that run counter to the
core purposes of the equal pay statutes. A number of these defenses,
however, have yet to be resolved in many Member States. Before assess-
ing the ultimate impact of equal pay legislation, it is necessary to await
the outcome of the conflicts and see what their effect is on the practical
implementation of comparable worth.
D. The Meaning of Pay
The fourth substantive legal question concerns which benefits provided
by an employer to his employees are to be regarded as "pay" or "remu-
neration." The issue at the heart of this recurrent problem is how closely
employers should be held to the principle of equality in the provision of
benefits, which from one point of view are acts of benevolence, but from
another are the tangible results of the employee's contribution to social
welfare. The courts of the Member States have generally considered the
question in the context of claims by women doing the same or similar
work as men. Yet, the courts appear even here to have taken inconsistent
positions. 168 In equal value cases, the question becomes even more com-
plicated; this will be examined by looking again at the British case of
Hayward v. Cammell Laird.169 First, however, one must consider the
issue in the context of "same" or "similar" work.
1. The Nexus Between Work and Benefit
Perhaps the most restrictive approach to the question of what consti-
tutes pay is to be found not in case law but in legislation. The 1981
Greek law on equality defines "remuneration" as "the wage, together
with any other additional benefits in cash or in kind awarded by the em-
ployer to the worker either directly or indirectly in exchange for work
performed."' 70 The narrowness of this definition is eased by the later
provision that "marriage allowances and child allowances... shall hence
forth be paid in full to the spouse or the parent who works, independent
of his or her sex."'171 Nevertheless, the definition appears narrower than
that in previous Greek constitutional case law.172 It also leaves open to
168. For the interpretation by the European Court of Justice, see Worringham and Hum-
phreys v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. (Case 69/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 767.
169. [1984] INDUS. REL. L. REP. 463. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
170. 1981 Law on Equality, supra note 79, § 4(2).
171. Id. § 4(5).
172. See, eg., 1983 O.P. III 520 (decision 520/1983 of the Cabinet).
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doubt whether all the bonuses and allowances paid by employers, which
in Greece often constitute very sizeable complements to the basic salary
and determine its real value, will be considered part of a worker's remu-
neration. This doubt is due to the uncertainty of what will qualify as a
benefit awarded "in exchange for work performed."1 73
In Irish law, the definition of "remuneration" more exactly follows
that of article 119 of the EEC Treaty, including "any consideration,
whether in cash or in kind, which an employee receives, directly or indi-
rectly, in respect of his employment from his employer." 174 This has
been interpreted to include bonus payments, marriage gratuities, prefer-
ential loans, subsidized living accommodations,1 75 commissions paid to
sales assistants, 176 disability benefits for injuries arising under the terms
of an income continuance plan provided and paid for by the company,177
and pensions.178 As yet, there exists no commonly accepted definition of
"pay," and the legal recognition of what constitutes remuneration differs
among Member States.
2. "Pay" and Equal Value Claims
In Hayward v. Cammell Laird, the industrial tribunal decided the ap-
plicant's work was of equal value to that of the comparators. After Hay-
ward, an "equality clause" was deemed to operate in British law in
relation to any variation between the applicant's contract of employment
and those of the male comparators. The tribunal did not determine the
precise effect of this, leaving open a further application to the tribunal if
the parties failed to agree. Despite negotiations after this first tribunal
decision, agreement was not reached on how the decision would be im-
plemented, and Hayward returned to the tribunal. 179
173. Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulous, La ligislation hellenique de I'equitd des hommes et des
femmes, in NATIONAL REPORTS, supra note 13, at 36.
174. Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act, supra note 59, § 1(1).
175. Cleary & Co. (1941) and 47 Female Employees, DEP No. 2-84, 38 LAB. Cr. ANN.
REP. (1984).
176. Id.
177. Shield Insurance Co. Ltd. and 2 Female Employees, DEP No. 8-84, 38 LAB. CT.
ANN. REP. (1984)."
178. In a series of cases, the Irish Labour Court has decided that "remuneration" included
occupational pensions. Linson Ltd. and ASTMS, DEP No. 2-77, 31 LAB. CT. ANN. REP.
(1977); Department of Public Service and Robinson, DEP No. 17-79, 33 LAB. CT. ANN. REP.
(1979); University College, Galway and Employment Equality Agency, DEP No. 2-85, 39
LAB. CT. ANN. REP. (1985). Despite at first suggesting that the issue be appealed to a higher
court on a point of law, Linson Ltd. and ASTMS, supra, the Labour Court has held since 1979
that the inclusion of pension schemes within the scope of remuneration "is now firmly estab-
lished." Review of Decisions on Equal Pay, 33 LAB. Cr. ANN. REP. 107 (1979) (Appendix
XIII).




The employer contended that he did not have to pay the applicant the
same basic wage and overtime rates as the male comparators because,
considered as a whole, the applicant's terms and conditions were not less
favorable. Hayward argued that once she had shown that she did work
of equal value, she was entitled to point to specific terms in her contract
that were less favorable than the comparators' terms, and then to have
the terms amended. The industrial tribunal declined to make the unqual-
ified declaration that the plaintiff had requested that her basic and over-
time pay be the same as that of her male comparators. Instead, it applied
what it considered to be a purposive interpretation of article 119, which
referred to "any other consideration whether in cash or in kind, which
the worker receives directly or indirectly in respect of his employment
from his employer,"' 80 and which considered the total remuneration
involved.
The problem was recognized by the tribunal as not having arisen previ-
ously because,
in dealing with matters on the earlier basis of "like work," the possibility,
indeed the probability, was that those whose jobs were being compared
would be subject to similar overall terms and conditions of employment
coming, as they did, from the same broad grouping. It was unlikely that
the applicant would turn out to be on staff conditions whilst the other was
hourly paid.181
Newer equal value claims had broadened the range of possible compari-
sons considerably aifd, in consequence, had increased the likelihood that
in such claims "the comparison being made may very well be between
persons whose basic terms and conditions of employment are different,
one being on staff conditions and the other regarded as a manual
worker."'812 This is exactly what happened in the Hayward case itself.
To accept Hayward's argument, however, might encourage an escala-
tion of wage claims. If the tribunal simply put the applicant's basic rate
of pay and overtime up to that of her comparators then,
far from being as well off as they are, she could, in fact, be better off. The
corollary to that is not, of course, hard to see. There would, if the matter is,
in fact, properly viewed in that way, and so dealt with, almost inevitably be
a leap-frogging effect leading to consequential claims from the other in-
volved in the situation.18 3
Furthermore, the tribunal believed that the general trend in labor law
was toward a broader view of pay:
180. Id. at 13.
181. Id. at 14.
182. Id. at 14.
183. Id. at 15.
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It seems to us quite clear that in modem economic conditions, many of the
benefits of employment are, in fact, received in forms other than cash. It
may well be that, in the past, the narrower view of the term 'pay' as money
and nothing else, was both acceptable and, in relation to earlier times, real-
istic... These things are not immutable, and new norms will emerge over a
period or time, as to what is acceptable. So we believe it to be with pay, and
that it would not now be sensible to cling to a narrow and outmoded view
of that term.184
So, while "fully appreciat[ing]" that there was a risk that the tribunal
would "become involved in a complicated balancing act beyond our
capabilitites and, indeed, outside our jurisdiction," it decided that this
should not deter it from "seeking to avoid too narrow a construction."' 85
The tribunal did, however, leave one major point undecided: whether
"contingent or potential rights" (e.g., sick pay) should be included. The
tribunal wrote: "Whilst not, at this stage, expressing any final or defini-
tive view, we entertain considerable doubts, and feel that our ultimate
conclusions on the point might well prove to be at variance with the
respondent [Cammell Laird]. The matter requires further considera-
tion." 186 The tribunal quite properly recognized many of the dangers
inherent in Hayward's claim, yet it declined to resolve most of them.
These problems will be worked out in various ways in the future, though
it is impossible now to predict how that will be done.
E. Collective Agreements
In all Member States, the legal questions examined here have been ad-
dressed in the context of a system of collective bargaining. The courts,
therefore, have often had to consider when the principle of equal pay as
judicially interpreted should supersede and replace voluntary collective
arrangements between employers and employees. This theme runs
through much of the national case law relating to equal pay, and through
labor law generally.
1. Challenging Collective Agreements
Although the decision by the ECJ in Defrenne18 7 upheld a challenge to
the results of a collective agreement, the approach taken in the Member
184. Id. at 15.
185. Id. at 16.
186. Id Hayward has recently been upheld by the E.A.T. See The Times (London), June
4, 1986. Cf Midland Health Board and Stokes, DEP No. 2-83, 37 LAB. CT. ANN. REP. (1983)
(Irish Labour Court held that subsidized staff accommodation provided by the Board did not
constitute remuneration because the accommodation "was only incidentally available").





States appears to vary from country to country. Under the original 1970
British equal pay legislation, for example, where a collective agreement
contains any provision applying specifically only to men or only to wo-
men, parties to an agreement or the Secretary of State may refer it to the
Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) to declare what amendments
need to be made in the agreement so as to remove that discrimination
between men and women.188 The extent to which discrimination in col-
lective agreements may be challenged directly is therefore limited and
would not appear to permit a successful claim based on equal value. 189
Similarly, a 1979 Italian Court of Cassation decision held that wage and
job evaluations made by collective agreements cannot be challenged and
annulled by courts unless the criteria adopted are openly discrimina-
tory-where they apply different criteria for men and women.190
It is equally clear, however, that equal value claims have the potential
for indirectly challenging the results of collective agreements. In one
case, for example, a British industrial tribunal rejected an argument that
a claim was inappropriate because one ancillary effect might be to over-
turn established bargaining procedures.' 9' The tribunal commented that
the legislation "is indeed a piece of remedial legislation which may have
far reaching and often unforeseen consequences."' 192 Thus, though indi-
rect challenges may be successful, direct attacks on the inequity extant in
collective bargaining agreements appear to have more chance of success.
2. The Position of Voluntary Job Evaluation Exercises
An equally controversial issue is the extent to which voluntary job
evaluation exercises are regarded as determining the question of how
value is to be assessed and when jobs are to be regarded as equal. Yet
188. Equal Pay Act, supra note 51, § 3. Until 1979, CAC had interpreted this jurisdiction
widely in a number of respects. In particular, the CAC went beyond the restriction that an
agreement must have a provision applying to men only or to women only, and intervened to
alter agreements where no such provision appeared on the face of the agreement but where
discrimination nevertheless was found. The Committee's definition of discrimination encom-
passed not only hidden intentional discrimination, but also cases in which the employer had
not completely eliminated the historical concept of a "woman's rate of pay." See Davies, The
Central Arbitration Committee and Equal Pay, 1980 CuRR. LEG. PROB. 165.
189. The United Kingdom has recently introduced a bill to amend this provision. Sex
Discrimination Bill, H. L. (72) 48/3 (1986). This provides that a term in a collective agree-
ment which contravenes the Equal Pay Act, as amended, would be void. Id. cl. 2. The bill
would preserve an individual's right to complain to an industrial tribunal about any action
taken by an employer under the agreement, but would provide no specific remedy against the
discriminatory collective agreement. It would repeal section three of the Equal Pay Act of
1970. Id. cl. 5.
190. See generally Ballestrero, supra note 144.
191. Leverton v. Clwyd County Council, Case No. 24349/84 (unreported decision, July
12, 1985), digested at 4 EQ. OPPOR. REv. 45 (1985).
192. Id. at 46.
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again we come to the question faced by the courts of how far the law
should interfere with the results of collective bargaining. In this area
there appears to be a consensus that these agreements should be given a
degree of deference, though there is no agreement on how much defer-
ence should be given.
In Ireland, the Labor Court has held that the 1974 Act does not bar
the use of the results of a voluntarily agreed job evaluation in the consid-
eration of a claim of equal pay: "[T]he results of a job evaluation exer-
cise can and should be among the considerations which an Equality
Officer ought to bear in mind."1 93 The Court went on to hold, however,
that while relevant, "[t]hat does not mean that they must be accepted
.. ..-194 Indeed, the Labour Court Review has noted that while job eval-
uation schemes have been produced in a number of cases, they have not
formed the basis of any decision. Of course, "[t]his may be due to the
fact that when produced by one party only the other side usually claims
bias." 195
In contrast, it appears that Italian case law provides that the value of
the job is "as normally evaluated by collective agreements or company
practices.1 196 The 1975 Dutch Act is somewhat less voluntaristic in its
approach, providing that
work shall be assessed in accordance with a reliable system of job evalua-
tion; to this end recourse shall be had as far as possible to the system cus-
tomary in the undertaking where the worker concerned is employed. In the
absence of such a system the work shall be fairly assessed in the light of the
available information. 197
The new British legislation allows an equal value claim to be resisted
by an employer on the basis that a voluntary job evaluation scheme has
already found the work not to be of equal value. 198 The concern that
such a scheme may be sexually biased is explicitly taken into account
with respect to already existing studies. Before a tribunal may exclude
an equal value claim on the basis of an already existing scheme, it must
decide that "there are no reasonable grounds for determining that the
evaluation contained in the study was.., made on a system which dis-
criminates on grounds of sex." 199
193. Data Products (Memories) Ltd. and Simpson, EP No. 20/78, 32 LAB. Cr. ANN. REP.
(1978).
194. C.H. Arthur and Sales Finance Co. and, ITGWU, EP No. 3/77, 31 LAB. Cr. ANN.
Rim. (1977).
195. Labour Court Review, 32 LAB. Cr. ANN. REP. 82 (1978).
196. Ballestrero, supra note 144, at 5.
197. Netherlands Equal Wage Act, supra note 72, § 4.
198. See Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations, supra note 76, § 2(A).




In one case,2°° a British industrial tribunal held that there was no pre-
sumption that a voluntary scheme discriminated on the grounds of sex.
The burden of proof, the tribunal asserted, lay on the employees to show
that there were reasonable grounds for believing that it did discriminate.
The tribunal adopted a particularly narrow test for determining whether
discrimination can be inferred: whether there is good reason to suppose
that any comparative value set by the system on any demand or charac-
teristic would have been given a more favorable value had those deter-
mining values not consciously or subconsciously been influenced by
consideration of the sex of those on whom the demands would chiefly be
made. The tribunal added that there would be sufficient reason for such
a supposition if it had found that a traditionally female attribute was
undervalued.20 1 The treatment of voluntary job evaluations has differed
among Member States and has posed difficulties for all.
3. Scope of Comparison and the Collective Agreement
Although the collective agreement is often seen as a barrier to the im-
plementation of equal value, there is no reason why this has to be the
case. The collective agreement may be facilitative in a number of ways,
including the determination of the proper scope of comparison. The ap-
proaches of the Member States vary on this issue, but are in general quite
narrow, and in the case of the United Kingdom, are largely restricted to
comparisons within an employer's establishment.
The British Central Arbitration Committee was not so restrictive in its
approach. Where, for example, a collective agreement covered an entire
trade, women were held to benefit even where there were no men in the
establishment in which they were employed.20 2 Davies has put forward
an explanation for the differences in approach between the CAC and the
tribunals:
[I]f the parties to the collective agreement have themselves chosen a wider
geographical scope for its provisions than the establishment, the Committee
may also be permitted to range more broadly, but ... the industrial tribunal
will in general not be in a position to know whether it is safe to do so, unless
200. Neil v. Ford Motor Co., [1984] INDUS. REL. L. REP. 339.
201. Id. at 402. For a criticism of this decision, see RUBENSTEIN, EQUAL PAY FOR WORK
OF EQUAL VALUES 84-85 (1985). The dispute continued after the decision, erupting into in-
dustrial protests which in turn led to the appointment of an independent job evaluation panel
by the company with the agreement of the unions. The panel found the work of the women
sewing machinists to be undervalued by the company's job evaluation system in 8 out of 28
characteristics that the panel recommended regarding. The panel's conclusions were accepted
by the company.
202. CAC Award No. 3313 (copy on file with the author).
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it can see that common terms and conditions apply in the different estab-
lishments and that the employers are the same or, at least, associated.20 3
4. Pay as Determined by the Collective Agreements
The extent to which the terms of the collective agreement should be
regarded as determining the meaning of "pay" has been an important
issue in Italy and West Germany, with apparently inconsistent decisions
being reached by the relevant courts. In Italy, a recent decision of the
Court of Cassation 2°4 modified its previously wide interpretation and
held that whether particular benefits such as extra bonuses and al-
lowances should be regarded a remuneration is to be decided by reference
to the collective agreement rather than by applying a more specific pre-
existing legal defintion. 20 5
In West Germany, however, the Federal Labor Court has taken a dif-
ferent approach in a number of cases. In 1973, for example, the court
held that the principle of equal pay in the Basic Law was breached by a
term in a collective agreement governing private insurance undertak-
ings.206 The agreement provided that a family supplement was payable
once per household to male employees, but only in more limited circum-
stances to female employees. A woman did not qualify for the allowance,
for example, if her husband was a professional who received a higher
income than she did and contributed more towards the upkeep of the
children. Male workers did not face the same restriction. This was unac-
ceptable to the court.
In 1982, the German Federal Labor Court held that women doing the
same work as men have the same claim to additional pay supplements
over and above basic rates laid down in the collective agreement. 20 7 In a
similar case regarding a collective agreement for the metalworking indus-
try in Berlin which provides that a married person's supplement is only
paid to married men, not to married women, the German Federal Labor
Court upheld the claims of married women seeking payment of this sup-
plement,20 8 but only for the past payments that had been missed. From
the time of the decision on, no one was eligible to receive the payment
because the whole clause was declared null and void.
The relationship between voluntary collective agreements and compul-
sory equal pay standards has particular poignancy in the area of equality
203. Davies, supra note 188, at 171.
204. Sentences No. 1069-1089/1984 (Court of Cassation) (copy on file with the author).
205. See Ballestrero, supra note 144, at 6-7.
206. See 4 AZR 339/72 (May 9, 1973).
207. See 5 AZR 1182/79 (Sept. 9, 1981), 197 EUR. INDUS. REL. REP. 4 (1982).
208. Bertellsmann & Rust, Equal Opportunity Regulations for Employed Women and Men




between men and women at work. On the one hand, collective bargain-
ing and union representation are likely to be the most effective avenues
by which real changes will be brought about, for the courts simply can-
not take over wage determinations in every industry. On the other hand,
an important part of the structure of pay inequality between men and
women is derived from, or is encapsulated in, previous arrangements
agreed to by these very unions. The trend appears to be towards the
replacement of voluntarism with legal regulation, but there are dangers
in such a movement. Unions in particular should be willing to adapt
their strategies to the new possibilities for legal action. Unfortunately,
relatively few appear to have done So. 2 0 9
III. Conclusion
Equal value, or comparable worth, as it is better known in the United
States, is an extremely complicated issue. To do it justice, one should
have a thorough grounding in industrial relations and organization the-
ory, labor economics, psychology, statistics, feminist theory, and law,
preferably both labor and employment discrimination law. This Article
has no pretensions to comprehensiveness in its review of the ever increas-
ing literature on the issue in these various disciplines. If it has value, it
will be because its comparative law perspective stimulates some alterna-
tive ways of viewing the limited questions with which this Article began.
Europe has by no means yet succeeded in inventing the best wheel, but
(for better or worse) its comparable worth jurisprudence is currently
"state of the art."
No doubt American readers will draw their own conclusions from this
study. I suggest three at this time. First, the jurisprudence surrounding
equal value in Europe shows the complexity of the issues. A common
law approach, that is, a case-by-case interpretation of broad and flexible
standards, has played a major role in permitting experimentation in Eu-
rope. Legislatures in the United States should perhaps not try to define
comparable worth too narrowly at this time, but instead permit an
equivalent period of development.
Second, if litigation is to be an important strand in a strategy of reduc-
ing pay inequality, the legal process is probably going to have to be
adapted to handle the resulting problems.210 It is arguable that the use of
modified labor law institutions, rather than the court system, has eased
209. For the results of a survey of the 20 largest British trade unions' policy on equal
value, see Unions' Experience of Equal Value, 4 EQ. Opp. REv. 12 (1985).
210. See McCrudden, Anti-Discrimination Goals and the Legal Process, in ETHNIC PLU-
RALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY 54 (N. Glazer & K. Young eds. 1983).
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the incorporation of equal value into the law of the Member States of the
EEC. That is currently the subject of some controversy. Perhaps the
American debate might usefully turn from considering whether compa-
rable worth is possible to considering what institutional modifications to
the traditional litigation model might serve an equivalent facilitative
function in the United States.
Finally, European subsidiaries of American companies now operating
in Europe have been subject to the legal requirement of equal value ever
since its implementation. The sky has not fallen. Perhaps the onus now
lies with those who would argue that their United States parent compa-
nies should not be held to comply with an equivalent standard.
In considering all the issues surrounding comparable worth, and in
examining the few initial comments just proposed, it is vital that there be
a more systematic flow of information among Member States, 21' and be-
tween Europe and the United States, in order to facilitate the sharing of
experience on this question. All problems benefit from shared knowledge
and from lessons learned through past experience. I hope that this Arti-
cle will contribute to that continued exchange and will help sharpen the
debate on comparable worth on both continents.
211. See Landau, supra note 87, at 68. Language differences present a problem for devel-
oping a more systematic flow of information. Landau's suggestion seems eminently sensible:
"If national court decisions were to be made more easily available. . . throughout the Com-
munity, by means of centrally monitored data, this would encourage cross-fertilisation and a
transfer of 'know-how' from one to another." Id.
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